No Animals Were Harmed...: Protecting Chimpanzees from Cruelty behind the Curtain by Fischer, Lorraine L.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 27 | Number 2 Article 4
1-1-2005
No Animals Were Harmed...: Protecting
Chimpanzees from Cruelty behind the Curtain
Lorraine L. Fischer
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lorraine L. Fischer, No Animals Were Harmed...: Protecting Chimpanzees from Cruelty behind the Curtain, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 405 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol27/iss2/4
"No Animals Were Harmed ... ":




I. Introduction ................. .................... 406
II. A nim als as Property ..................................................................... 407
III. C him panzees ................................................................................. 411
IV . Problem atic "A ctors" .................................................................. 413
A . Cruelty on Stage and Screen ...................................................... 416
B. Illusory Oversight by the American Humane Association ..... 417
V . H ollow L aw ................................................................................... 422
A . The A nim al W elfare A ct ............................................................. 423
B. The Endangered Species Act ...................................................... 428
C. The Regulation of Migratory Birds as an Example
for C hange ..................................................................................... 432
D . State A nti-Cruelty Laws .............................................................. 433
VI. Liberty & Equality Rights for Chimpanzees ............................ 437
V II. C onclusion .................................................................................... 440
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May
2005; B.A., English, University of California, Los Angeles, 2002. I would like to express
my deep gratitude to Bruce Wagman and Sarah Baeckler for their guidance and
exceptional editorial assistance, as well as Karen Cunningham for teaching me so much
about writing. I would also like to thank my family, Patty, John, and Jeff, my friends Olivia
and Christy, and my fianc6 Aaron for their continuing love, support, and encouragement.
"The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged
by the way its animals are treated."1
I. Introduction
It is easy to think of at least one television show, commercial, or
movie that has used a chimpanzee as an "actor" to imitate humans, to
perform stunts, or to otherwise amuse an audience. Suppose the
audience knew the truth-that before the chimpanzee appeared on
the screen, she was stolen as an infant from her murdered mother and
family; that if she survived the tortuous journey to America,2 she was
then routinely beaten with heavy objects in the name of training,
mentally abused, and confined to a cage? If they knew about that
history, would the use of chimpanzees in various forms of
entertainment still seem amusing or charming to the audience?
Although chimpanzees exploited in entertainment are not regularly
obtained from the wild as they once were, their exploitation in
entertainment continues to be unacceptable because they (and other
great apes) are not only sentient beings, but beings capable of
suffering, forming relationships, expressing emotion, mourning death,
communicating thoughts, and expressing love.' If this were not
enough, chimpanzees are a severely endangered species and their use
1. Mahatama Gandhi (1869-1948). According to Gandhi, the more helpless a
creature, the more entitled it is to protection by man from the cruelty of man.
2. In the past, to obtain an infant chimpanzee from the wild:
hunters with shotguns or flintlocks loaded with pebbles or metal shrapnel attack
mothers and other protective group members. Many infants die when this crude
ammunition scatters to hit both mothers and their clinging offspring. Pit traps,
poisoned food, wire snares, nets and even dog packs are also used to kill adults
defending the youngsters. Infants are often tied hand and foot with wire, causing
circulation loss and septic wounds, and are trucked to urban centres in tiny cages
or tightly bound sacks, often under heavy suffocating loads to avoid detection at
checkpoints. Few receive care en route, so starvation and dehydration are
commonplace. While awaiting shipment overseas, more die of neglect in filthy
holding pens and at airports where flight delays lead to exposure. Cramped in
tiny crates, even carried in personal luggage, the victims often must endure days
of travel through several transit points. Some infants manage, against all odds, to
survive this ordeal only to die at the final destinations from cumulative physical
and psychological trauma. In addition, it is estimated that [a]t least ten
chimpanzees die for every infant that survive[d] more than a year at the final
overseas destination.
GEZA TELEKI, They Are Us, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND
HUMANITY 296, 301 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St. Martin's Press 1993). See
also, 55 Fed. Reg. 9129 (March 12, 1990).
3. See generally the books of Jane Goodall; See also infra notes 26 to 30 and
accompanying text.
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as animal actors contradicts and offends the strong public policy of
conservation and preservation that should be afforded to this
precious species.
In this note I hope to effect a change in the way chimpanzees and
other exotic animals are perceived when seen in filmed media, and
ultimately, to effect a change in the way chimpanzees and other great
apes may be lawfully employed in entertainment. With an emphasis
on chimpanzees, I will illustrate why any use of great apes in
entertainment (including television, commercials, movies, and live
shows) is cruel, appalling, and shocking to the conscience of any
reasonable person-and ultimately unacceptable in our society. I will
begin by briefly looking at the legal status of animals and by noting
the striking similarity between the status of animals and the historical
status of slaves and women. Next, a detailed look at the sophisticated
mental and behavioral characteristics of chimpanzees and the
numerous similarities existing between their characteristics and those
of humans will demonstrate why these creatures deserve to be treated
as more than a form of property to be owned and exploited by man.
Afterwards, a look at the use of chimpanzees in entertainment and a
glimpse at the training practices documented by an undercover
volunteer at a major animal training facility will demonstrate why
chimpanzees must have legal protection from exploitation in filmed
media. Lastly, an analysis of various federal regulations, including the
Animal Welfare Act and the Endangered Species Act, as well as a
look at a variety of state anti-cruelty laws, will illustrate how the law
fails to protect chimpanzees from the cruelty inflicted on them for use
in entertainment.
II. Animals as Property
The primary obstacle preventing chimpanzees from obtaining the
right to be free from commercial exploitation in entertainment is the
classification of nonhuman animals as property,4 a classification
justified by a "speciesist" perspective. "Speciesism" is defined in the
Oxford English Dictionary as discrimination against or exploitation of
animal species by human beings based on an assumption of mankind's
superiority.5 Speciesism is "a bias, as arbitrary and hateful as any
4. "The property status of nonhumans presents the highest hurdle for animal
advocates ... Some might say that to change this status is an insurmountable barrier,
unprecedented and impossible." SONIA S. WAISMAN, ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 73 (Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2002).
5. Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, (2d ed. 1989).
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other"6 because it justifies a level of cruelty in proportion to an
animal's degree of dissimilarity to humans' instead of using a more
practical approach that contemplates an animal's ability to suffer,8 or,
his inherent value. Speciesism should be considered in tandem with
the proposition that "all classifications are artificial," 9 and that
"[s]pecies, as we describe them, are matters of convenience rather
than biological reality." 10 Classifications are of course not artificial to
the extent that a species is a group of animals embodying the same or
similar features. However, classifications do function artificially when
used to disadvantage one category below another-as is the case with
chimpanzees and humans. Chimpanzees are legally treated like forms
of property because they are not classified as homo sapiens, yet they
share characteristics which support their treatment as humans in
many ways."
Some authors suggest that chimpanzees and other great apes are
regarded as property under the law because "[t]hey challenge the
possibility of drawing a neat boundary line between humans and
animals. They are neither completely human, nor completely animal,
but both at once, or somewhere in between."12 Perhaps some people
find it too uncomfortable to abandon a speciesist perspective and
thereby acknowledge chimpanzees and other animals as something
more than property, because a speciesist perspective is necessary to
justify the way animals are treated for our entertainment, clothing,
and food. 3 However, an increasing membership consider it "sheer
6. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS 24 (Perseus Books Groups 2002).
7. Speciesism also justifies arguments that measure "tolerable" cruelty according to
an animal's social popularity, agricultural uses, or commercial value.
8. This sentiment began with the famous words of Jeremy Bentham: "The question
is not, can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but can they suffer. Why should the law refuse
its protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when humanity will extend its
mantle over everything which breathes." AnimalRightsMalta.com, Quotes, at
http://www.animalrightsmalta.com/quotes.htm] (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
9. R. I. M. Dunbar, What's in a Classification?, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT:
EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 109, 110 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St.
Martin's Press 1993).
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 26 to 29 and accompanying text.
12. RAYMOND CORBEY, Ambiguous Apes, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT:
EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 126, 130 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St.
Martin's Press 1993).
13. "The apes' ambiguous similarity to ourselves, including a whole repertoire of
emotions, gestures and other behaviours we immediately recognise, makes them a
potential threat to our own identity, and results in our complex reactions to this close
relative of ours. This threat makes it necessary for humans to reaffirm vigorously the ape's
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arrogance to perpetuate the anthropocentric views established by
[our] ancestors simply because that was the collective human
impulse.' ' 14 It may have been normal to regard animals as "dumb
creatures" when their sophisticated mental abilities were unknown,
but today such an argument cannot be made. It only seems
appropriate that the status of animals evolve just as our
understanding of them has. As succinctly put by Justice Holmes, it is
"revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. [And i]t is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."'5
The premise underlying speciesism-that animals are inferior
simply because they are not human-parallels the justifications once
used to classify African-Americans as slaves and women as an
unintelligent and inferior species of humans. Slaves were abducted
from their native land, withdrawn from their families, their resistant
relatives killed, then bought, sold, and traded as goods of commerce
in much the same way infant chimpanzees have been obtained and
traded. 16 In many ways the chimpanzee trade is the African slave
trade brought back to life. 7 First, slavery was justified because
African-Americans were not Caucasian and as such, were considered
inferior and therefore objects of property-this is similar to the
reasoning used to justify exploitation of chimpanzees. Second,
African-Americans were slaves because they were an exotic and
unfamiliar group of people that perhaps threatened Caucasians in
much the same way that apes challenge the boundaries of
personhood. Third, nonhuman animals, like slaves, are often regarded
as less than human, but more than property. 8 This paradox, and the
brutish animality and low status, in order to protect the clearcut boundary between
humans and animals. For this boundary is one that we need desperately, in order to be
able to go on killing and eating millions of animals every year, while we refrain from
killing or eating humans. Id. at 130-31.
14. TELEKI, supra note 2, at 302.
15. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457.
16. Although it is no longer the common practice to obtain chimpanzees for
entertainment in this way, chimpanzees continue to be abducted from the wild for other
uses, such as bush meat. And, of course, the tragic history of today's entertainment
chimpanzees-now bred in small cages--is that described in the Introduction.
17. Id. at 301.
18. "A pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a
person and a piece of personal property." Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc., 415
N.Y.S.2d 182, 182 (1979). In addition, Fable v. Brown, 2 Hill Eq. 378, 382 (S.C. 1835)
acknowledged the quasi-property status of slaves by recognizing that they are chattel
under law "yet in many cases, they are treated by laws as persons, and reasonable persons
accountable for their actions. They are punished for crimes, which chattels could not be."
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inability of both slaves and animals to neatly fit into a category as
either property or person, is a reflection of the unsuitability of the
property classification for either humans or great apes. If something
does not properly fit within a property mold, then why treat it as
such? Lastly, the fact that slavery was eventually recognized as
intolerable lends support to the idea that the boundaries of
personhood and property are not static, and at the very least, are not
as rigid as they once were, thereby suggesting it is possible to
"transform" (for some purposes) from property to person."
In addition to slavery, the treatment of non-human animals also
has some parallels to the historical treatment of women. "[I]t was
once regularly asserted with the utmost confidence that women were
failed men."2 Women held positions as fictitious persons. Upon
marriage the existence of a woman merged with that of her husband.
A woman could not own or manage property, form a binding contract
of a personal nature, and could not bring suit in her own name.21 A
married woman lost all the legal incidents attaching to a person acting
in her own name. Women were human, yet their existence and their
rights were defined by their relationship to a man. Like nonhuman
animals and slaves, women too inhabited the realm in between person
and property. For instance, In re Ricker, 29 A. 559 (N.H. 1890) held
that women were not citizens for purposes of a statute setting forth
the requirements of becoming an attorney, but nonetheless admitted
that the word "citizen" in the common and comprehensive sense
undoubtedly included women. 3
Despite the similarities that exist between the historical
treatment of slaves and women as compared to the current status of
great apes, slaves and women possessed something that great apes do
WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 77. Interestingly enough, animals in ecclesiastical courts
were often charged with crimes and held accountable for their actions; in the sixteenth
century a group of mice were represented by Bartholomew Chasseee, a distinguished
French jurist, for feloniously eating and destroying the province of Autun's barley crop, in
1266 a pig convicted of eating a child was publicly burned, and in 1386 a sow was
sentenced to be mangled and maimed and then hung for causing the death of a child. Id. at
8-11.
19. "As property laws are a human construct and not an inherent characteristic of
physical objects, there is always conceptual space for innovation." David Favre, Equitable
Self Ownership of Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473,479 (2000).
20. Paul Waldau, Will the Heavens Fall? De-Radicalizing the Precedent Breaking
Decision, 7 ANIMAL L. 75, 77 (2001).
21. Burdeno v. Amerse, 14 Mich. 91, 92 (1866), in WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at
81.
22 Id.
23. Id. at 83.
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not-inclusion in the human species. The essential factor demanding
a change in the way African-Americans and women were perceived in
the legal system was the fact that they were human despite being
different from Caucasian males. "The reason that an exceedingly
small number of decisions actually have sought to justify the status of
nonhuman animals as human property is that judges normally fail to
perceive that it requires justification. As human slavery once was, the
legal thinghood of nonhuman animals is accepted as first principle."
24
Since African-Americans and women were human, their treatment as
less than human had to be justified, and eventually such treatment
could not. However, chimpanzees and other nonhuman animals lack
this "human" component, and as such, their right to be free from
cruel exploitation in the entertainment industry must be justified in
some other way.25
III. Chimpanzees
Chimpanzees are similar to humans in many striking ways.26 It is
important to recognize that chimpanzees are not only closely related
to humans genetically, 27 but also behaviorally, 28 emotionally,2
9 and
24. Id. at 92.
25. In Equitable Self Ownership of Animals, Professor David Favre suggests an
intermediate status in which the interests of animals are recognized by the legal system but
the framework of property law is still used for limited purposes. Id. at 94.
26. "Scientific evidence confinring the close kinship [between humans and
chimpanzees] can be seen in a wide range of shared traits. Example: chimpanzees exhibit
many technical skills, from using stone implements to making assorted plant tools for
specific purposes, which are acquired by learning and feature cultural variation. Example:
chimpanzees share with us many cognitive abilities, such as long-term memory, self-
recognition, sense of humor, even some elements of linguistic talent. Example:
chimpanzees are so close to humans in body structure and chemistry that blood
transfusions and organ transplants are feasible. Example: many emotional states are so
alike for both chimpanzees and humans that each intuitively understands how to interact
with the other." TELEKI, supra note 2, at 298.
27. "In DNA structure [chimpanzees] differ from us by only a little over 1 percent."
MICHAEL NICHOLS & JANE GOODALL, BRUTAL KINSHIP 58 (Aperture 1999).
28. "When friendly [chimpanzees] meet after separation they may fling their arms
around each other, hold hands, pat one another on the back, kiss. If they are suddenly
frightened or excited they may reach out to touch or embrace. If they want a share of
another's food, they beg, palm up. When they play, they laugh and tickle one another;
when angry, they swagger and shake their fists." Id.
29. "In the summer of 1982 Kat [a longtime research volunteer working with Roger
Fouts and Washoe, the first chimpanzee to learn ASL] was newly pregnant, and Washoe
doted over her belly, asking about her BABY. Unfortunately, Kat had a miscarriage, and
she didn't come to the lab for several days.... Knowing that Washoe had lost two of her
own children, Kat [signed] MY BABY DIED to her. Washoe looked down to the ground.
Then she looked into Kat's eyes and signed CRY, touching her cheek just below her eye.
... When Kat had to leave that day, Washoe wouldn't let her go. PLEASE PERSON
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mentally.0 "Chimpanzees, along with bonobos, are the apes that have
the closest biological relationship with our own species. . . The
anatomy of their brain and central nervous system is more like ours
than is that of any other living creature."3 1 In contrast to how they
may be perceived by abusive animal trainers, chimpanzees are not
dumb savage animals unfeeling and unaware of the world around
them. Chimpanzees "use insight, not just trial and error to solve
problems. They have complex mental representations, understand
cause and effect, imitate, and cooperate. They compare objects and
relationships between objects. Given appropriate opportunity and
motivation, they may teach, deceive, self-medicate, and empathize.
They [even] transmit culture between generations."32 In sum,
chimpanzees
share with us ... the faculty for (non-verbal) language, a hatred of
boredom, an intelligent curiosity towards their environment, love
for their children, intense fear of attack, deep friendships, a horror
of dismemberment, a repertoire of emotions and even the same
capacity for exploitative violence that we ourselves so often show
towards them. Above all, of course, they show basically the same
neural, behavioural and biochemical indicators of pain and
distress.33
However, it is not this multitude of similarities to humans in and
of itself that makes chimpanzees and other great apes deserving of
the right to be free from exploitation in the entertainment industry.
The right stems from the fact that the treatment and training of
chimpanzees in the entertainment industry parallels the evils of
slavery and inflicts on chimpanzees the same kind of cruelty that
slavery inflicted on African-Americans. 34 Exploitation in the
entertainment industry mirrors slavery because these animals
HUG, she signed." ROGER FOUTS, NEXT OF KIN: WHAT CHIMPANZEES HAVE TAUGHT
ME ABOUT WHO WE ARE 291 (William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1997).
30. Captive chimpanzees "have been taught 300 or more of the signs of ASL, the
American Sign Language used by deaf people. ... Chimpanzees can identify themselves
and companions in pictures and mirrors. They have a concept of self." NICHOLS &
GOODALL, supra note 27, at 58.
31. Id.
32. WISE, supra note 6, at 4.
33. Richard D. Ryder, Sentientism, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY
BEYOND HUMANITY 221, 221 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St. Martin's Press
1993).
34. Generally speaking, chimpanzees have been abducted from their natural habitat,
torn from their family group, exported in commerce, and beat into subjection ("training")
in order to generate income for their owner as an "actor." Captive chimpanzees are
deprived of virtually every facet of a normal, healthy life, and are instead restricted to a
life of cages and beatings. The parallels to slavery are undeniable, especially when coupled
with the psychological, behavioral, and emotional similarity to humans.
experience life in much the same way that humans do, so much so
that if something would be cruel or detrimental if done to a human
then it would also be cruel if done to a chimpanzee.
IV. Problematic "Actors"
Chimpanzees are problematic "actors" because they cannot be
domesticated. Several factors contribute to the cruelty that falls upon
chimpanzees in their life as animal "actors." First, chimpanzees are
curious, mischievous, and intelligent. "Chimpanzees are first and
foremost social creatures. That means that loneliness and boredom
are the two biggest enemies of chimpanzees in captivity .... It is hard
to think of a worse candidate than the chimpanzee for confinement..
. and adherence to a monotonous, institutional routine."35 Second,
chimpanzees in their natural environment occupy a large
geographical range while living in a highly interactive social group.
"Chimpanzees, like humans, need rich environments, social
stimulation, and physical freedom in order to thrive. With few
exceptions, neither the testing, zoological, or entertainment industries
have managed to consistently provide those things for them."
6 In
addition to a chimpanzee's disposition and requisite living
arrangement, chimpanzees usually do not have long careers as
"actors" because as adults they become too strong and too difficult to
control."
The need to control a chimpanzee "actor" is of utmost
importance because hostile attacks create legal liability and because
the job of an actor is to perform on cue within the first few takes.
35. FOUTS, supra note 29, at 30.
36. NICHOLS & GOODALL, supra note 27, at 108.
37. "Chimpanzees are relatively controllable only for the first few years of life. For
this reason, many young chimps who start their lives as pets or entertainers are given to
laboratories when they grow too big to handle. ... In the entertainment business, some
[chimpanzees] live into adulthood in horrific conditions-controlled by shock-collars or
beaten by their trainers, living in small cages, forced to perform absurd acts, or even
drugged to keep their natural energy at bay." Id. In addition, "performing chimpanzees
are usually children stolen from their mothers," and many are "sent to research labs when
they were no longer 'cute,' easy to handle or profitable." New England Anti-Vivisection
Society, From Stage to Lab Cage: Chimpanzees in Research and Entertainment, at
http://www.neavs.org/downloads/chimpbrochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). Further
still, "[o]nly infant and toddler chimpanzees are used in the entertainment industry
because they are so small and not nearly as strong as an adult chimpanzee. If for some
reason an adult is used then they are usually clothed with some type of shocking apparatus
under their clothing. Most chimpanzees used in entertainment have their front teeth
pulled or bashed out to prevent biting." Fauna Foundation, Chimpanzees in the
Entertainment Industry, at http://www.faunafoundation.org/sanct/chimps/chimpsentertain
.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Fauna].
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Some exotic animal proprietors claim their chimpanzees are trained
with love and affection,3 but this is simply not true.
With kindness, patience, and reward, a chimpanzee can be taught
to do almost anything. But to get instant obedience, which is
required if a chimp actor is to deliver the same performance day
after day, the trainer usually tries to establish him- or her-self as an
all powerful, utterly dominant figure. This is done in "pretraining"
sessions, when no one is around. Typically the young chimp is
bullied into abject submission, usually by being beaten over the
head with an iron bar. A number of circus performers have testified
about this, thereby forfeiting their jobs.
39
Affection training describes a method purportedly used to train
animals by rewarding desired behaviors. However, affection training
is not a scientific principle and is actually a misnomer for the
psychological principle of positive reinforcement. Animal trainers use
the phrase "affection trained" to characterize the ideal way in which
an animal could be trained, although it is not a reality, especially for
exotic animals forced to live in an unnatural way and perform
unnatural acts-among humans. Furthermore, positive reinforcement
is only effective if the reward is sufficient to induce repeated displays
of the desired action, and meager food rewards are not a sufficient
lure to train chimpanzees.4 Further still, several chimpanzee trainers
disregard a major component of positive reinforcement-that
undesirable activity is ignored and not punished. In contrast to the
principals of positive reinforcement, "[i]f a chimpanzee is not
performing properly or [is] misbehaving then disciplinary measures
are usually taken by ... trainers, some of these measures in the past
have involved baseball bats, lead pipes, cattle shockers, chains,
hitting, and kicking."
41
38. "All our animals are Affection Trained with love, respect and positive
reinforcement. This produces animals that enjoy learning and working." Amazing Animal
Actors, at http://www.amazinganimalactors.com/animals/animals.asp) (last visited Jan. 24,
2004); "We have raised all of our animals from when they were babies and have nurtured
them with affection and respect." Brian J. McMillan, Hollywood Animals: Exotic &
Domestic Animals for Film & TV, at http://www.hollywoodanimals.com (last visited Jan.
24,2004)
39. NiCHOLS & GOODALL, supra note 27, at 71.
40. "[Itt is naive to assume that chimpanzees can be compelled to perform complex
tricks with simple positive reinforcement such as a jellybean or other treat. The tricks are
just too complex, and the rewards are just too small to hold their interest. The plain truth
is this: the only thing that will make them stop behaving like curious, rambunctious
chimpanzees and, instead, routinely perform mundane tasks over and over again on cue is
abject fear of physical pain." The Chimpanzee Collaboratory, Campaign to End the Use of
Chimpanzees in Entertainment, at http://www.chimpcollaboratory.org/news/testimony.asp)
(last visited Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Collaboratory].
41. Fauna, supra note 37.
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Abusive tactics like these were commonplace at Amazing
Animal Actors in Malibu, California. Sarah Baeckler worked
undercover as a volunteer at Amazing Animal Actors to determine
the treatment of chimpanzee "actors." Baeckler is a primatologist,
holding undergraduate degrees in Primate Behavior and
Anthropology, and a Masters degree in Primatology, making her
quite familiar with the behaviors and dispositions of chimpanzees.
She worked approximately 1000 hours at this training facility from
June 2002 to July 2003 and witnessed "sickening acts of emotional,
psychological, and physical abuse every single day on the job. 42 At the
animal facility,
[t]rainers physically abuse the chimpanzees for various reasons, but
often for no reason at all. If the chimpanzees try to run away from a
trainer, they are beaten. If they bite someone, they are beaten. If
they don't pay attention, they are beaten. Sometimes they are
beaten without any provocation or for things that are completely
out of their control.
43
Although these eyewitness accounts are limited to the actions
recorded at one facility, this abuse is not isolated and cannot be
explained away as acts occurring at one bad facility.44 The abuse does
not stop at the training facility, but continues at the set as
chimpanzees are forced by fear to perform stunts as "actors." In fact,
Baeckler found an electric cattle prod inside a bag that had
accompanied an older male chimpanzee on a television commercial
42. Collaboratory, supra note 40. Baeckler never personally abused any of the
chimpanzees but "was specifically instructed to hit or kick them at the first sign of any
aggression or misbehavior." "Since [Baeckler] wanted to learn how severe the abuse could
get, [she] asked for advice on how hard the chimpanzees should be hit or kicked, and got
[these verbatim] answers: One trainer told me, quote, 'Hard enough that they know you
mean business but not so hard that you do permanent damage.' Another said, 'Aim for
her head because it's really sturdy.' And I heard the director of the compound say, 'Kick
her in the face as hard as you can. You can't hurt her.' When I expressed nervousness one
day about being bitten, a trainer handed me a hammer and said, 'If you need to hit her,
use this,' and he pointed to the handle end of the hammer." Id.
43. Id.
44. "[A] confidential source described her experiences at another chimpanzee
training facility in California [to Baeckler]. She said that the trainers there commonly
"thumped" the chimpanzees to keep them in line. Interestingly, at Moorpark College (a
California community college with a teaching zoo), a professor once told [Baeckler] that
they would never consider having chimpanzees in the college's zoo because they were 'not
willing to inflict the kind and amount of punishment required to train them.' This
professor, who had worked for yet another chimpanzee trainer in the industry, said that
'people beat them with baseball bats to control them.' He also said 'some trainers will
whack a chimp if it doesn't do a small behavior, like a smile, because later the chimp might
think it can get away with more.' In short, abuse and physical violence are commonplace
in this industry, and it's not even a secret. In fact, it's taught in a training school that is
currently producing many future animal trainers and zoo workers." Id.
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shoot.45 Interestingly enough, only a handful of cities in the U.S. have
bans prohibiting the use of chemical, manual, and electrical means to
make an animal perform.46
A. Cruelty on Stage and Screen
As will be discussed later, one of the problems facing
enforcement of animal cruelty laws with respect to chimpanzee
"actors" is the fact that most of the abuse occurs behind closed doors
or on private sets. Thus, most instances of abuse go unnoticed by the
public. However, Project X, ironically a film about the misuse of
chimpanzees in medical research, was not one of those projects. The
film was submerged in controversy concerning the abuse of
chimpanzees on the set as well as the death of a chimpanzee,
allegedly due to "training" injuries sustained during filming.47 Sadly,
chimpanzees used in the film were returned to medical research when
the film was finished. 8 Another film, Any Which Way You Can,
starring Clint Eastwood, led to the death of Clyde, the orangutan who
was Eastwood's sidekick; Clyde was essentially beaten to death by his
trainer for not paying attention.49 One of the more notorious incidents
of abuse that became public was officially reported in a defamation
case against the Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) and the
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). The case was
initiated by Bobby Berosini, a well known animal trainer who was
caught on videotape backstage before his show at the Stardust Hotel
in Las Vegas beating his orangutans.51 Particularly outraging about
this case was the fact that "Berosini, himself, testified that in his
opinion it is often necessary to hit an orangutan to keep him under
45. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying note 168.
47. New England Anti-Vivisection Society, From Stage to Lab Cage: Chimpanzees in
Research and Entertainment, at http://www.neavs.org/downloads/chimpbrochure.pdf (last
visited Jan. 24, 2004).
48. Id.
49. "The assistant to Gentle Jungle's head trainer told the media that the trainer beat
Clyde to make him docile during the filming. He told reporters that one day before
filming, the trainer ordered him and another trainer to help him take Clyde to an isolated
spot because he wanted to 'have a little talk with him.' When Clyde became inattentive the
trainer repeatedly beat him with a cane and an axe handle. Clyde tried protecting himself
with his arms and rolling in a circle, trying to avoid the blows which were ultimately fatal.
He died of cardiac arrest a month after the beating." Performing Animal Welfare Society,
Earth and Animal Resources. Animals in Movies and Television, at
http://www.pawsweb.org/site/resources/factsheet-moviestv.htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2004).
50. PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269 (1995).
51. Id. at 1272-73.
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control."52 PETA broadcast the tape and Berosini sued for
defamation. After years of litigation, the Nevada Supreme Court
held:
the videotape is not "false" because it is an accurate portrayal of
the manner in which Berosini disciplined his animals backstage
before performances. The videotape is not defamatory because
Berosini and his witnesses take the position that the shaking,
punching, and beating that appear on the tape are necessary,
appropriate and "justified" for the training, discipline, and control
of show animals."
If it is "necessary" to physically and psychologically abuse an
animal (up to and including death) in order to obtain its obedience
for a performance, then a reasonable person would conclude that
such animal is not appropriate for performing. The point is made
clear in the case of domestic animals such as dogs. A dog, for
instance, may be taught to perform a variety of stunts with the lure of
minor rewards like food and praise. Dogs also live with humans,
which makes interacting with them either on a set or in a household
significantly less traumatic because dogs are not only domesticated,
but also are at ease in these types of locations. In contrast,
chimpanzees and other great apes are not domesticated, are not
motivated by the same things that would be of interest to
domesticated animals, and have more complex needs, which make
these beings simply unfit for a lifestyle with humans performing
unnatural stunts in unnatural environments. Despite behind-the-
scenes oversight by the American Humane Association, training
abuses like those found in the aforementioned projects continue to
plague animal "actors."
B. Illusory Oversight by the American Humane Association
The American Humane Association (AHA) is an organization
formed to protect the interests of animals used in filmed media.
However, the AHA now plays an important role in perpetuating the
notion that animals are properly treated and not harmed in the
entertainment industry.
The AHA's familiar film end credit disclaimer, "no animal was
harmed during the making of this production, '" 4 is intended to, and
52. Id. at 1275 n.6.
53. Id. at 1272.
54. The AHA has established guidelines describing a standard of care that should be
provided for animals when used in filmed media. Projects complying with the standards
established by the American Humane Association are then able to use the AHA's
trademarked end disclaimer: "No animal was harmed during the making of this
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largely does, convince the public that films with the disclaimer are
"cruelty free." The appearance of the disclaimer misleads the public
because the AHA's rating is reasonably interpreted to literally mean
that an animal appearing in a film was not injured as a result of that
appearance when in fact the AHA only monitors certain very limited
aspects of a production, and even then films have displayed the
disclaimer without the AHA's knowledge or consent.5 In addition to
this misleading disclaimer, retired AHA Director of the Film and
Television Unit Gini Barrett has stated that "[m]ost of the time,
animals in motion pictures enjoy one of the best lifestyles for animals
in the world. 56 However, the disposition of chimpanzees documented
by Jane Goodall and Roger Fouts, in addition to the incidents
witnessed by Sarah Baeckler at Amazing Animal Actors, suggest
otherwise.
The AHA was formed in 1877 as a national charity and has
"been working with producers to facilitate safe, effective, and
efficient performances by animal actors since the 1940s. 57 Since 1980,
a clause in the Screen Actors Guild producer contract has granted
sole authority for monitoring the treatment of animals in movies,
television shows, commercials and music videos to the AHA's Film
and TV Unit. 8 The AHA's stamp of approval misleads the public into
thinking that the use of chimpanzees in entertainment is not cruel or
abusive. However, as discussed in the proceeding sections, a
chimpanzee cannot perform without being beaten, mistreated, and
"trained" to act opposite of her innate character, and a chimpanzee
cannot be "trained" without suffering countless instances of cruelty in
order to be afraid of behaving naturally. 9 Although the AHA
specifies that its role is to prevent "legally defined cruelty to
production." American Humane Association, Guidelines, at http://www.ahafilm.org/
guidelines.html (last visited Feb. 19,2004).
55. See infra notes 73 and 74.
56. Ralph Frammolino & James Bates, Questions Raised About Group That Watches
Out For Animals in Movies, L.A. TIMES, February 9, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, L.A. Times File.
57. American Humane Association, AHA Guidelines For The Safe Use of Animals in
Filmed Media, p. 3, at http://www.ahafdm.org/document/guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb.
19, 2004) [hereinafter AHA Guidelines].
5& Id. at 4.
59. "[H]ealthy, young chimpanzees are playful, curious, energetic, and mischievous,
but these traits don't serve them well when training begins, so one of the things that
chimpanzees in the entertainment industry have to endure is an initial 'breaking of the
spirit.' In other words, they have to learn how NOT to act like normal chimpanzees."
Collaboratory, supra note 40.
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animals," 6 the AHA sends a false message to filmed media audiences
by suggesting that animals appearing on the screen were not harmed
in any way when in actuality the life of a chimpanzee "actor" is
consistently cruel. Although the chimpanzee may not have been
injured on the set, the chimpanzee was undoubtedly abused and
cruelly treated at some point.
So while the image conveyed by the AHA is that it protects
animals from abuse and injury, the organization merely assumes a
coaching role suggesting to studios and production crews what should
be done without setting forth actual requirements. The idea behind
such an organization (to monitor and in fact to protect the interests of
animals in filmed media) is commendable, but the current practices of
the AHA leave much to be desired. Specifically, the AHA promotes
guidelines instead of demanding compliance with rules, it uses an
ambiguous rating system, it has not strictly monitored the use of its
disclaimer, and it suffers from poor funding and improper staffing.
The AHA promulgates pseudo-regulations61 that merely suggest
to studio and production crews actions to take regarding the use of
animals; but the desires of the producer or director are implicitly
prioritized over the animals' interests. For instance, the "basic
principles" section of the AHA guide states, "if an animal must be
treated inhumanely to perform, then that animal should not be
used."62 In addition, the "AHA will enforce all applicable anti-cruelty
laws as necessary.,63 The brief definitions section of the guidelines
fails to define "humane" or "inhumane." The guidelines are
permissive rather than mandatory, so that the ultimate decisions are
left to the filmmakers. The only terms the AHA guidelines define are
"animal," "animal handler," and "motion picture or filmed media."
Without a more comprehensive list of definitions the guidelines do
not provide much guidance. What constitutes rest, safety, humane,
appropriate condition, or non-injurious material? Even more
shocking is provision 207 of the AHA guidelines, which substitutes
60. AHA Guidelines, supra note 57, at 4. For instance, in California, cruelty includes
killing, maiming, torturing, or wounding a live animal with malice or intent. In addition,
anyone who overdrives, torments, or deprives of necessary sustenance or shelter, or
anyone who causes any of these actions to happen similarly commits cruelty. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 597 (West 2004).
61. "The AHA aggressively advocates that each production meet [the standards
established by the AHA], and provides ongoing guidance on how to do so." Id. at 4.
(emphasis added). The AHA's "aggressive advocacy" is hardly a requirement to ensure
the safety of animals exploited in filmed media.
62. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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the judgment of a veterinarian for that of the AHA animal handler in
the event that an animal becomes sick or injured.6' Compounding
these inadequacies is the fact that AHA "[m]onitors were granted law
enforcement powers in California in 1997, but no arrest has ever been
made or ticket issued by a monitor."' A nonexistent enforcement
rate hardly suggests that the AHA is "enforcing all applicable anti-
cruelty laws as necessary."
The AHA's rating system of "Acceptable," "Believed
Acceptable," "Unknown," "Questionable," "Unacceptable,"
"Acceptable/Questionable," or "Acceptable/Unknown" is nearly as
useless as its guidelines. The AHA specifies that, under the
"Acceptable" rating, the film has been evaluated solely on the
treatment of the animals during production and animal action during
filming has been supervised to insure humane treatment.66 A
"Believed Acceptable" rating designates films with animal action that
the AHA did not directly supervise, but has nonetheless concluded
that no animals were abused or endangered. 6 The "Questionable"
rating is assigned to films in which no animals were intentionally
harmed yet questionable practices were used.6 An "Unknown"
designation is given to films in which the AHA was not present on set
and was unable to substantiate information regarding the use of
animals.6 Lastly, a rating of "Unacceptable" informs the public that
deliberate cruelty occurred in the production of the project.7 ° The two
final combination ratings suggest that both types of animal treatment
occurred. Are seven different degrees of acceptability really
necessary? It would appear that a film either follows humane
practices, engages in inhumane practices, or the practices are
unknown. However, an ambiguous rating system is to be expected
from a set of guidelines that merely encourage humane treatment
without defining acceptable treatment and without requiring it of
media groups. Even with one of the seven ratings assigned to a
64. "If an animal is injured, sick or becomes incapacitated it shall be treated
immediately. Such animal shall not resume work until it has been determined by the
animal trainer or the veterinarian that the condition has been corrected." Id. at 10.
65. "We've threatened to, and that's the end of the discussion right there," said
Karen Rosa AHA Coordinator of Communications. Christopher Noxon, Helping Trigger:
LA Group Protects Movie Animals, Reuters, (July 3, 2003), at http://www.trashcity.org/
WEIRD/ODD039.HTM.
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certain film, how can the public trust a rating issued by an
organization that is largely funded by major film studios?71 A closer
look at the little-known unit reveals that the group has been slow to
criticize cases of animal mistreatment, yet quick to defend the big-
budget studios it is supposed to police.72
Misuse of the AHA's end credit disclaimer presents another
problem since films have haphazardly used the disclaimer without the
AHA's authorization. "The 'no animals were harmed' seal appeared
on New Line Cinema's "Simpatico," despite the death of [a] horse
that ruptured a ligament and staggered to the ground during filming
at the Los Alamitos racetrack. The AHA said it was unaware that the
film carried its approval."" The message conveyed by the AHA's seal
of approval is even more deceiving if the organization cannot
ultimately control the use of their end credit disclaimer. In addition,
"[s]hock collars and BB guns were used to train horses for 'Running
Free,' a Sony Pictures release about wild horses filmed in Namibia.
The AHA gave the movie high marks on its Web site without
disclosing the controversial training techniques, which the association
discourages."74
Lastly, the AHA's Film and Television Unit Director "has been
accused by her own staff of interfering with animal welfare probes
that could prove embarrassing to filmmakers and studios., 75 In
addition, the director has acknowledged that the AHA film unit lacks
the staffing and resources to keep tabs on the nearly $8 billion film
industry.76 The spirit of the AHA is not carried out in the practices of
the Film and Television Unit. The AHA would be a more admirable
organization if, instead of suggesting how animals should be treated
in filmed media, it required studios to conform to a set of humane
standards that did not succumb to the preferences of producers or
directors. Furthermore, the AHA's "No Animals Were Harmed..."
disclaimer would carry more weight if its use was strictly regulated
and limited to films that do not injure animals before, during, or after
filming.
71. Frammolino & Bates, supra note 56, at Al.
72 Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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V. Hollow Law
The body of law relating to animals often begs the question: Is it
better that the law be certain, predictable, or stable, or is it better that
the law be right by expressing a community's present sense of
justice? 77 Generally speaking, the law fails animals when, irrespective
of current societal views, it prefers to be certain, predictable, and
stable. More specifically, the law has failed to provide animals with
adequate protection from cruelty for three primary reasons. First, a
substantial line of precedent supports the archaic notion that animals
are a form of property.8 Second, certain animals are expected to
fulfill a specific purpose in society and as a result the law permits
treatment of these animals in a way that is consistent with this
purpose.7' Lastly, animal laws often prioritize and promote an
important human interest over that of a given animal.
Historically the law only protected animals, and particularly
livestock, because the loss of such animals represented a financial loss
to the owner. The first laws to address the interests of animals
without regard to their value as property were in the form of anti-
cruelty statutes.8 However, the purpose behind these laws was not to
promote the interests of animals directly," but instead to prevent
77. WISE, supra note 6, at 27-28.
78. As previously mentioned, Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc., 415
N.Y.S.2d 182 (1979), disagreed with prior precedent holding that a dog is only an item of
personal property, by holding that "a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place
somewhere in between a person and a piece of property." The court further noted,
"[l]osing the right to memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a family picture album
is not actionable. But a dog is something else. To say it is a piece of personal property and
no more is a repudiation of our humaneness." In contrast, Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (1994) stated that "in viewing a pet as more than property, the Corso
opinion, and the few cases that follow it, are aberrations flying in the face of overwhelming
authority to the contrary."
79. "The standards of animal welfare [are], for the most part, determined not by
some moral ideal that comes to serve as a legal standard for determining what constitutes
,unnecessary' suffering or 'cruel' treatment, but rather, 'unnecessary' suffering [is]
understood in terms of that suffering that does not serve some legitimate purpose... [and]
all uses of animals that generate social wealth [are] regarded as legitimate." Gary L.
Francione, Animals, Property, and Legal Welfarisr" "Unnecessary" Suffering and
"Humane" Treatment of Animals, 46 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 721,744-45 (Winter 1994).
80. The interests of animals were accommodated as an effect of discouraging
undesirable behaviors in people. "[M]ost courts agree these statutes are intended to
prevent humans from acting in cruel ways toward each other and regard cruel treatment
toward animals as leading to cruel treatment toward humans." Id. at 753.
81. The "rationale for the anticruelty statutes is, for the most part, that cruelty to
animals has a detrimental impact on the moral development of human beings .... [T]he
animal is viewed as instrumental to some goal of humans and the duty is indirect as far as
the animal is concerned." Id. at 757.
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"acts which may be thought to have a tendency to dull humanitarian
feelings and to corrupt the morals of those who observe or have
knowledge of those act[s]." ' Modern law has since progressed in the
way it perceives animals. Currently, there are a variety of laws that
attempt to promote the interests of animals; they include federal
enactments like the Animal Welfare Act, the Endangered Species
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and state laws in the form
of anti-cruelty statutes.
A. The Animal Welfare Act
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) 83 authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate standards governing the humane handling,
care, treatment, and transportation of animals.84 At first blush, the
AWA appears to provide substantial protections to animals, but
difficulty enforcing the alleged protections, and the enactment of
various exemptions, paralyzes the purpose of the Act.85 In addition, a
prominent problem "enforcing the AWA, and making the spirit and
intent of the Act as set forth in the House Reports a reality, [is] the
difficulty establishing standing to sue." 6 To establish standing in
federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy both constitutional and
prudential requirements.
To satisfy the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must suffer,
or be in imminent danger of suffering "an injury in fact"; the
plaintiff's injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct;
and a favorable ruling on the plaintiff's claim(s) must be able to
remedy the problem of which the plaintiff complainsY
An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest,'8
and can be found, for instance, in the form of an esthetic 9 or
82 Commonwealth v. Higgins, 178 N.E. 536,538 (1931).
83. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1976).
84. Id. at § 2143(a)(1). The standards established by the Secretary set the minimum
requirements for "handling, housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter
from extremes of weather and temperatures, [and] adequate veterinary care."
85. "[T]he USDA has consistently promulgated regulations that, taken as a whole,
have actually served to undermine the spirit of the AWA and render the statute nearly
ineffective." Deawn Hersini, Can't Get There From Here... Without Substantive Revision:
The Case For Amending the Animal Welfare Act, 70 UMKC L. REv. 145, 147 (Fall 2001).
86. WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 520-21.
87. Id. at 227-28.
8& Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
89. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that injury to an esthetic interest
in the observation of animals is sufficient to satisfy the demands of Article III standing."
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 ("the desire to use or observe an animal species, even
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informational injury.' ° For instance, the court in Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998), found that
a plaintiff had been harmed by observing animals living under
allegedly inhumane conditions and had established a constitutionally
cognizable injury in fact. However, the plaintiff's frequent visits to
zoos and parks were undoubtedly an important factor in establishing
a sufficient esthetic interest and imminent injury. The imminence
prong ensures that the injury is not too speculative and that the injury
is either ongoing or impending. 9 Imminence is important because the
court does not want to issue advisory opinions in which no injury
occurs. 92 However, pleading an injury in fact that is satisfactorily
imminent is more difficult than it sounds. For instance, in ALDF v.
Espy, plaintiff Patricia Knowles was a psychobiologist who had
worked extensively in research labs that experimented with mice. She
brought suit alleging a violation of the AWA for excluding birds, rats,
and mice from the definition of "animal." The Court found Dr.
Knowles' alleged injury insufficient to establish standing because it
was too remote.93 Specifically, the court found fault in the fact that
plaintiff was not currently employed and that she chose to engage in
this particular line of work.94
To satisfy the second prong of constitutional standing, a plaintiff
must not only trace the injury to the defendant's conduct, but
Supreme Court precedent also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the challenged agency action authorizes the conduct causing the
plaintiff's injuries.95 To determine if causation is present, a
comparison must be made between what the defendants did and what
the plaintiff alleges the defendant should have done under the statute
for purely esthetic purposes is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose[s] of
standing.").
90. An informational injury is justiciable where the information sought is essential to
the injured organization's activities and a lack of the information will render these
activities infeasible. Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
91. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496,500 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
92 Id.
93. Id. at 501.
94. Plaintiff "merely states that at some undefined future time she 'will be required to
engage in further research,' and even that is in part not literally true. She will not be
required to do so. Whether she will do so is wholly within her control. Six years ago
[plaintiff] decided that her energies could most profitably be spent on activities other than
research. That choice has determined the present state of affairs, in which she suffers no
injury and will not do so unless she makes a further choice to subject herself to it. We
cannot say that the injury she seeks to litigate is 'certainly impending."' Id. at 500-01
95. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 440.
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providing the cause of action. 96 In Glickman, the plaintiff was able to
satisfy the causation requirement by alleging the USDA failed to
adopt the specific minimum standards required by the AWA for the
care and housing of primates.97 In addition, the plaintiff was able to
describe how the conditions at the facility in which he observed
animals complied with the USDA regulations, how the regulations
failed to comply with the standards set forth by the AWA, and how
the USDA's regulations failed to protect him from incurring an
esthetic injury. 8
The third prong of constitutional standing is redressability, which
requires a finding that a favorable decision by the court will likely
remedy the injury complained of by the plaintiff. The lucky plaintiff
in Glickman, who was able to demonstrate an injury in fact, was also
able to satisfy the redressability prong of constitutional standing. The
court found his regular and routine visits to Game Farm, his plans to
return to the farm in the next several weeks, as well as his intention to
continue visiting the animals there important to ensuring that a
favorable decision would likely redress his injury.99 "Tougher
regulations would either allow Mr. Jurnove to visit a more humane
Game Farm or, if the Game Farm's owners decide to close rather
than comply with higher legal standards, to possibly visit the animals
he has come to know in their new homes within exhibitions that
comply with the more exacting regulations."' 0
In addition to the constitutional requirements of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability, there are three prudential requirements
that must also be satisfied before bringing a claim under the AWA.
First, a plaintiff may not raise a third party complaint without
showing an independent and individual injury; second, a plaintiff may
not bring suit on the basis that all citizens experience the same harm;
and third a plaintiff's statutory claim must be within the zone of
interests intended to be protected by the statute. 11 The zone of
interests test has been characterized as "generous and relatively
undemanding."' ' A plaintiff falls within the zone of interests if the
interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably within
96. Id. at 441.
97. Id. at 443.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 444.
100. Id.
101. WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 228.
102. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 444.
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the protections offered by the statute. 3 The test focuses both on
those who Congress intended to benefit, and on those who in practice
can be expected to police the interests that the statute protects.1°4 In
addition, the "test requires some indicia-however slight-that the
litigant before the court was intended to be protected, benefitted [sic]
or regulated by the statute under which suit is brought.""'
Additional standing requirements are implicated when an
organization files a suit.
An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.' 6
The germaneness prong for establishing organizational standing is not
meant to unduly restrict the occasions on which an association may
bring a suit on its members' behalf, but rather, is meant to require
only that an organization's litigation goals be pertinent to its special
expertise and the grounds that bring its membership together. 1°7
Satisfying standing requirements is an arduous task in bringing a
suit under the AWA. The standing doctrine is further complicated by
inconsistent and unpredictable case law l08 and by frequent and
sometimes heavy-handed exercise of judicial discretion.' °9
Courts and commentators agree the case law on standing presents
one of the most confused areas of federal jurisprudence. The
federal courts have been erratic at best in describing and defining
the contours of the doctrine and the Supreme Court has openly




106. Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 53 (1988).
107. Id. at 56.
108. For a survey of standing cases see: Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972);
Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (1985); Humane Soc'y
of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (1988); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (1994); Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (1998); Alternatives Research & Dev. Found. v.
Glickman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 7 (2000).
109. "Standing is a threshold question, and a court's determination of the issue should
not include any consideration of the merits of a lawsuit. Nevertheless, commentators
generally agree the Supreme Court's standing precedent has changed based on the Court's
perception of the merits and value of bringing a particular action or type of action."
WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 227.
110. Id.
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has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various
cases decided by [the Supreme] Court which have discussed it."''
It becomes increasingly difficult for people to protect the
interests of animals through enforcement of the AWA when
establishing standing to sue is so difficult. However, private suits are
an important element in enforcement of the AWA, since enforcement
by the USDA has proven inadequate. In addition to criticism by
animal welfare organizations, the USDA Office of the Inspector
General has criticized the agency's enforcement, noting failures to
promptly inspect facilities, renewals of licenses following documented
violations without re-inspections, and failures to collect penalties, in
addition to other deficiencies.12 To remedy the enforcement problems
of the AWA, one author suggests amending the Act to include a
limited qui tam provision. She sees "[a]llowing a certain class of
plaintiffs to step into the shoes of the state in order to enforce the act
against a violator [as] one of the best ways to fill the wide gaps the
USDA has created through non-enforcement [because] the qui tam
plaintiff [would be] relieved of the burden of showing an
individualized, personal injury in fact." '113 Another solution involves
adding a citizen-suit provision to the AWA, similar to the one found
in the Endangered Species Act (ESA),114 which grants standing to
111. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). See also, Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 n.13
(1976):
After today's decision the lower courts will understandably continue to lament
the intellectual confusion created by this Court under the rubric of the law of
standing .... The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has
become an area of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written
appears to have been designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than
future guidance. The Court has itself characterized its law of standing as a
"complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction."
112. Hersini, supra note 85, at 148.
113. Id. at 165.
114. Under the citizen suit provisions of the ESA:
any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of [the ESA] ... or
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply . . . the prohibitions [in the act] ... with
respect to the taking of any resident endangered or threatened species within any
State; or
(C) [require] ... the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 ...
which is not discretionary ....
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2003).
In addition, district courts have jurisdiction, "without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any provision, or to order the
Secretary to perform such act or duty." Id.
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citizens who sue to enforce the Act. However, the Supreme Court has
severely limited the effectiveness of enforcing the ESA via the
citizen-suit provision by limiting the ability of plaintiffs to rely on the
automatic conferral of standing. More specifically, the Court requires
plaintiffs who are the beneficiaries of a statutory scheme to meet a
stringent injury-in-fact test to establish constitutional standing to sue
to enforce or enjoin a violation of the Act, regardless of the citizen-
suit provision. 115 Another author makes a convincing argument for
amending the ESA to include an animal-suit provision to remedy the
deficiencies of the citizen-suit provision.'16 An animal-suit provision
would create a cause of action in animals that qualify for protection
under the Act to sue through human proxies to enforce the Act or to
enjoin violations of it. " ' The arguments supporting the addition of an
animal-suit provision to the ESA are also compelling with respect to
the AWA. It is clear that an animal-suit provision would improve
enforcement not only of the ESA, but also of the AWA.
B. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 118 has been described by the
Supreme Court as the "most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."" 9
The Court has also noted that the ESA protects animal life, in
particular those nearing extinction, at "whatever the cost."' The
ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to determine if any species
is endangered or threatened due to habitat destruction,
overutilization (for commercial, recreational or education purposes),
disease, predation, or other natural or manmade factors. 2' Therefore,
the purpose of the ESA is twofold: to provide a means by which the
ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend
115. Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand For It? Amending the Endangered Species Act
with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 633, 634 (2004).
116. Id. at 635.
117. Id.
118. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973).
119. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
698 (1995) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) [hereinafter Tenn.
Valley Auth.]).
120. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184.
121. See N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)).
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may be conserved, and to provide a program for the conservation of
those species. 12
In order to implement the ESA, the Secretaries of Commerce
and Interior delegate responsibilities to the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The
ESA's protection of a species and its habitat is triggered only when
the appropriate Secretary lists a species as either "endangered" or
"threatened."1'2 A species is "endangered" when it is in "danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." '124 A
species is "threatened" when it is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future.'2 "[T]he decision whether to list
a species as endangered or threatened [is supposed to be] based solely
on an evaluation of the biological risks faced by the species, to the
exclusion of all other factors."1 26
As already noted, the purpose of the ESA is conservation of
endangered and threatened species. 2' "Conservation" includes "the
use of all methods... necessary" to eliminate the need for further
conservation measures.' 2 Thus, the recovery of endangered species is
"the first priority" under the ESA.129 "The plain intent of Congress in
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost."'1 Accordingly, if a species is listed, the
government has an affirmative duty to take all necessary steps to
protect and increase endangered populations.13" ' For example, in
Andrus, plaintiff claimed regulations governing "twilight hours" for
sport hunting of migratory game birds were arbitrary and capricious.
The government claimed the ESA only prohibited regulations that
jeopardize the continued existence of protected species. Thus,
because the most important factor affecting the bird population was
the quality of its habitat, the agency argued a minor alteration in
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(5)(b) (1973); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1973).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1973).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1973).
126. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 480.
127. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), (c) (1973).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1973).
129. See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 181.
130. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
131. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.C.C. 1977) [hereinafter
Andrus]; Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 92 F. Supp. 2d
1296, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 616 (5th Cir. 1998)
("each federal agency is required to take whatever... actions are necessary to ensure the
survival of each endangered and threatened species").
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shooting hours was unlikely to jeopardize the birds.'32 The court
disagreed:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife
Service, as part of the Interior, must do far more than merely avoid
the elimination of protected species. It must bring these species
back from the brink so that they may be removed from the
protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so. The
Service cannot limit its focus to what it considers the most
important management tool available to it, i.e., habitat control, to
accomplish this end....
The agency has an affirmative duty to increase the population of
protected species.... [I]t is apparent that the rulemaking process
was not adequately focused upon the obligation of the Fish and
Wildlife Service to conserve and increase the population of these
species. In this sense, then, the regulations must be said to be
arbitrary. 33
An important-and here, especially relevant-power is retained
by the government with respect to threatened species. Specifically, the
appropriate Secretary has the authority to make special rules for
threatened species under Section 4(d) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. section
1533(d): "Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall issue
such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for
the conservation of such species." These "special rules" severely
undermine and offend the spirit of the Act-especially with respect tochimpanzees. 134
Special rules prevent chimpanzees from receiving full protection
under the ESA because these rules have allowed chimpanzees to
become split-listed. In the Federal Register of April 19, 1976, 41 Fed.
Reg. 16466, the FWS proposed to classify both the chimpanzee and
pygmy chimpanzee (bonobo) as "threatened" species. 35 At this time,
all chimpanzees (irrespective of wild or captive designations) were
characterized as threatened species and entitled to the significant
protections provided by the ESA. However, because threatened
species are subject to the special rulemaking provisions of section
132. See Andrus, 428 F. Supp. at 169.
133. Id. at 170.
134. The ESA is also criticized for: the lack of sufficient funding needed to carry out
species conservation, the sluggish listing process, the piecemeal and reactive structure of
the statutory provisions, and the ESA's general failure to adequately protect biodiversity.
Nancy Kubasek, M. Neil Browne, & Robyn Mohn-Klee, The Endangered Species Act.
Time ForA New Approach?, 24 ENVTL. L. 329,336 (1994).
135. The proposed listing was based on the following cited factors: destruction of
chimpanzees' natural habitat; capture and export of chimpanzees for research laboratories
and zoos; the spread of disease from people to chimpanzees; and ineffectiveness of
existing regulatory mechanisms. 41 Fed. Reg. 16468 (Apr. 19, 1976).
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1533(d), this equal treatment almost immediately disappeared. The
FWS proposed a special rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(c) ("Section 17.40"),
which acts as an exemption from the ESA protections. Section 17.40
provides that the protections for threatened species do not apply to
captive animals in the United States on the effective date of the rule
(October 19, 1976), or to the offspring of such animals, or to the
offspring of threatened animals legally imported into the United
States after the effective date of the rule. This represents the first, and
most important, "split," since it resulted in different treatment of
chimpanzees under the ESA, depending on whether they were
captive or wild. Captive chimpanzees no longer were entitled to the
protections provided by threatened status, while wild chimpanzees
were. Notably for purposes of a potential challenge, the resulting final
rule, incorporating the exemption, contains no discussion or analysis
of the special exemption under section 17.40. This is in violation of
the requirement that the Secretary have a conservation-minded
reason for the rule.
On November 4, 1987, the Humane Society of the United States,
the World Wildlife Fund, and the Jane Goodall Institute petitioned to
have the classification of chimpanzees changed from "threatened" to
"endangered." ' 16 They were mostly unsuccessful. On March 12, 1990,
the FWS published its final rule, reclassifying only wild populations of
chimpanzees and all populations of pygmy chimpanzees from
threatened to endangered.137 In the proposed rule, the FWS discussed
the rationale for the section 17.40 exemption as "intend[ing] to
facilitate legitimate activities of U.S. research institutions, zoos, and
entertainment operations, without affecting wild chimpanzee
populations."1'3 Thus, captive chimpanzees retained a threatened
status, with the corresponding section 17.40 exemption still in effect. 39
The FWS considered several arguments put forth by numerous
interested parties in support of reclassification of captive chimpanzees
to endangered status-and rejected them all (including arguments
136. The petitioners argued the status of the chimpanzee had deteriorated
substantially since the species was originally classified as "threatened" in 1976. They cited
the reasons for the deterioration as massive habitat destruction; fragmentation of
populations and associated vulnerability to disease; excessive hunting and capture; and
lack of effective national and international controls. See Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Finding on Petition and Initiation of Status Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 9460
(Mar. 23, 1988).
137. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for
Chimpanzee, and Pygmy Chimpanzee, 55 Fed. Reg. 9129 (Mar. 12, 1990).
13& 55 Fed. Reg. at 9129.
139. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 9129.
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that the special rule/lower status could stimulate commerce in
chimpanzees, that the split-listing was responsible for the population
decline, and that both captive and foreign populations were not self-
sustaining-to name a few).' 4° While this is the "true" split listing, it
does not seem to have had any practical effect, except to protect wild
chimpanzees from ever being subject to a special rule. (It may result
in different treatment under some international laws or CITES, 14 but
as far as the ESA is concerned, the actual change was in classification
only.)
The FWS' perception of entertainment operations as
"legitimate" activities is completely contradictory to the conservation
purpose of the ESA, and to the affirmative duty to rehabilitate
dwindling species populations. One of the goals of the ESA is to
protect animal species from "overutilization for commercial
purposes" and to protect animal life at "whatever the cost." These
goals are wholly ignored by split-listing chimpanzees under the ESA
and by permitting their continuing use as "actors."
C. The Regulation of Migratory Birds as an Example for Change
Currently, there are laws that accomplish for eagles what the
AWA and ESA fail to accomplish for chimpanzees. Strict federal
regulations have been enacted to protect migratory birds, most
notably with regard to eagles. 142 These regulations have made it nearly
impossible to use an eagle in entertainment. Such stringent
regulations offer a useful example of the type of laws that should be
enacted for the protection of chimpanzees. It is illegal to sell,
purchase, barter, trade, import, export, or offer for sale, at any time
or in any manner, any bald eagle or any golden eagle, or the parts,
nests, or eggs of these birds, and the Department of the Interior will
not issue a permit to authorize these acts.143 It is also illegal to
transport into or out of the United States any live bald or golden
eagle, or any live egg of those birds, and the Department of the
Interior will not issue a permit to authorize these acts.'" In addition to
these prohibitions, federal regulations further restrict the use and
140. See 55 Fed. Reg. 9131-33.
141. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
142. These regulations include: Migratory Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2003);
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715s (2000); Migratory Bird Permits,
50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2003); Eagle Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 22.11 (2003).
143. 50 C.F.R. § 22.12(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
144. 50 C.F.R. § 22.12(b) (2003).
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possession of eagles. For instance, a falconry permit may only be
issued for golden eagles, and even then, possession and transportation
is permissible only if compatible with the preservation of golden
eagles and only if the applicant is qualified to possess and transport
golden eagles for falconry purposes.'45 In addition, a permit
authorizing the taking, possession, or transportation of lawfully
possessed bald or golden eagles, their parts, nests, or eggs may only
be granted for scientific or exhibition purposes of public museums,
for public scientific societies, or for public zoological parks.
4
The cumulative effect of these regulations is to essentially
prohibit anyone, except a very small group of people from handling,
let alone exploiting, an eagle. Chimpanzees could be spared the
miserable life of "actors" if similarly strict regulations were enacted
for their protection and conservation.
D. State Anti-Cruelty Laws
In addition to federal regulations, state anti-cruelty statutes, as
well as local ordinances, are used to regulate the use or treatment of
all animals, including chimpanzees. Although the language of most
cruelty statutes is broad enough to prohibit the training practices of
many exotic animal trainers, several factors prevent these statutes
from having any significant effect. First, the difficulty of catching
violators in the act presents severe problems because training occurs
behind closed doors in private facilities or in secluded areas on media
production sets. Second, "many anticruelty statutes contain broad
exemptions for virtually all of the activities that traditionally involve
animal suffering and death."'147 Third, most anti-cruelty statutes
impose relatively minor penalties for a violation, which signal to
society that such conduct while illegal is not viewed as particularly
egregious.' 4' Fourth, animal cruelty offenses are not taken seriously by
law enforcement officials, who are often reluctant to enforce the law
even against obvious offenders. 149 Lastly, few states allow a private
right of action to remedy a situation in which a criminal statute is
being violated, and this only increases the problem of non-
145. 50 C.F.R. § 22.24(b)(7)(d) (2003).
146. 50 C.F.R. § 22.21 (2003). Furthermore, under this section the Department of the
Interior "will not issue a permit under this section that authorizes the transportation into
or out of the United States of any live bald or golden eagles, or any live eggs of these
birds."





enforcement. The anti-cruelty laws of California, New York, and
Florida provide a glimpse of the different ways some states have
approached the issue of defining cruelty and providing a suitable
punishment.
California has one of the toughest anti-cruelty laws in the
country and enforcement of the law appears to be more rigorous than
in many other states.1'5 Anyone who with malice or intent kills,
maims, tortures, or wounds a living animal may be imprisoned and/or
subject to a fine of not more than $20,000.151 Additionally, anyone
who overdrives, torments, or deprives any animal of necessary
sustenance or anyone who causes any of these actions to happen, may
be guilty of a felony and subject to a fine not exceeding $20,000
and/or imprisonment. 152 Given California's broad statutory language,
animal dealers exploiting chimpanzees as "actors" could easily be
prosecuted under this statute because anyone who in "any manner
abuses any animal" violates the law. However, a problem enforcing
California's law arises when the State must prove willfulness or
malice,153 because a defendant may often prevail by showing the
charged conduct was part of some institutionalized animal
exploitation acceptable in the particular industry that per se involves
inflicting suffering or death on animals. However, proving mere
intent is usually a lower standard, and requires that the act be
conscious and voluntary in contrast to intending cruel conduct.1
New York's definitions of "animal" and "torture or cruelty" are
extremely straightforward and provide the framework for the statute
to include any injurious act to animals. The law defines "animal" to
include every living creature except a human being, and "torture or
cruelty" as every act, omission, or neglect, whereby unjustifiable
physical pain, suffering or death is caused or permitted. 55 The fact
that "unjustifiable" qualifies the type or degree of physical pain that
is prohibited is an important distinction. When "unjustifiable physical
pain" is the standard, a "defendant can easily raise a reasonable
doubt that would preclude criminal liability by arguing that the
cruelty was 'necessary' to achieve some 'accepted' end, so that the
conduct is not within the scope of the anticruelty statute. 16 Although
150. FRANCIONE, supra note 147, at 119.
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 597(a) (2003).
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 597(b) (2003).
153. FRANCIONE, supra note 147, at 136.
154. Id.
155. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350 (McKinney 2003).
156. FRANCIONE, supra note 147, at 134.
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New York's law is similar in language. to California's law, it
additionally provides that the animal in question may be either wild
or tame and that any person furthering, encouraging, or instigating
the act of cruelty is equally liable. 57 An important distinction between
the California and New York laws is the severity of the punishment,
with New York being more lenient by only charging a misdemeanor
offense punishable by imprisonment of no longer than a year or by a
fine of not more than $1,000 or both.' However, New York's law is
important in that it provides for enforcement by a public servant
other than a police officer. 59 This provision allows someone who is
specially authorized by law to issue and serve citations when there is
reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense.
1 60
Florida takes an interesting approach to defining "animal" and
"torture" that are equally, if not more inclusive in scope than New
York's anti-cruelty law. Florida's law specifies that not only within
the anti-cruelty chapter, but also in every law of the state relating to
or in any way affecting animals, the word "animal" includes every
"living dumb creature." 6 ' In addition, the words "owner" and
"person" include corporations, and impute the knowledge and acts of
its agents and employees to the corporation itself.' 62 However, similar
to New York's law, the words "torture," "torment," and "cruelty"
include every act, omission, or neglect only when unnecessary or
unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused.1 6 Florida's anti-cruelty law
applies a penalty that increases with repeat offenses and/or with the
severity of the act. In contrast to both the California and New York
laws, Florida's law acts not only to punish the offender, but also to
correct the offender's violent inclination. The first offense is punished
as a misdemeanor with imprisonment and/or a $5,000 penalty.'9
However, where the finder of fact determines that a violation of this
subsection includes the knowing and intentional torture or torment of
an animal that injures, mutilates, or kills the animal, the violator must
pay a minimum mandatory fine of $2,500 and undergo psychological
counseling or complete an anger management treatment program.165
157. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2003).
15& Id.
159. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20 (3) (2003).
160. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 371 (McKinney 2003).
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.02 (West 2003).
162. § 828.02.
163. § 828.02.
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12 (1) (West 2003).
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12 (2)(a) (West 2003).
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This requirement, while modern in its counseling requirement,
actually reflects the traditional notion of furthering the interests of
people by promoting the interests of animals since a person who
abuses animals is more likely to abuse women or children.
66
Although these anti-cruelty statutes take a variety of approaches
to combating violence towards animals, they do not provide
protection to chimpanzees. California's tough punishment provisions,
New York's public servant enforcement mechanism, and Florida's
psychological counseling/anger management requirement, while
innovative and forward-looking, mean nothing if the offenders cannot
be caught abusing an animal or do not satisfy the mens rea
requirement for cruelty. However, the solution may be found in the
power of local ordinances.
At first blush it might seem local ordinances could not have
much impact on a problem such as chimpanzee abuse, but they can.
The appeal of local ordinances is that they are easier to pass into law
than state regulations and can prohibit an animal act altogether,
thereby eliminating the problem with enforcing anti-cruelty laws
against private acts of cruelty. Several cities ban animal acts
completely,1 67 others prohibit the use of chemical, manual, or electric
means to make an animal perform, 168 while others impose strict
regulations on the use of animal acts. 69 The local ordinance in
Revere, MA provides that "no living non-domesticated animal may
be displayed for public entertainment or amusement on property
owned by the city of Revere, or on city-owned property under lease,
or on private property, excluding competitive arena sports and
exhibits deemed educational by the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals."'7 ° In addition, "[n]o captive
166. WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 400. See also FRANCIONE, supra note 147, at
30 ("As a historical matter, the concern for child welfare and the concern for animal
welfare were closely connected.").
167. These cities include: Pasadena, CA; Encinitas, CA; Stamford, CN; Hollywood,
FL; Lauderdale Lakes, FL; Quincy, MA; Revere, MA; Provincetown, MA; Takoma Park,
MD; Port Townsend, WA; Braintree, MA; Boulder, CO; Orange County, NC; Estes Park,
CO; and Redmond, WA. Circuses.com, Local Bans on Animal Acts in the United States, at
http://www.circuses.com/cban.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
168. These cities include: Pompano Beach, FL; Tallahassee, FL; Collinsville, IL;
Woodstock, IL; Jefferson County, KY; and Southampton, NY. Id.
169. These localities include: Cedarburg, WI (requires criminal background check for
circus employees); Fairfax County and Spotsylvania County, VA (no public contact
between animals and people is permitted); Walikill, NY (no contact between people and
tigers, lions, or bears is permitted); Oklahoma City, OK (prohibits nondomestic cats and
canines, primates, and bears on display). Id.
170. Revere, MA Rev. Ordinance 6.04.031 (March 2004).
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animal shall be forced to live out of its natural environment,
separated from its own species and displayed to the public in any
exploitive manner..... Local ordinances like the one in Revere, MA
accomplish for cities what the federal government should provide
nationwide.
The AWA, ESA, and state anti-cruelty laws only protect
chimpanzees from training tactics in theory. Most cruelty to
chimpanzees occurs behind closed doors and without detection from
authorities. The problem of enforcement is compounded by the
relatively low priority that animal cruelty cases receive in
prosecutorial offices. Therefore, an express prohibition on the use of
chimpanzees and other great apes in television, movies, and
commercials would eliminate the cruelty and abuse inherent in
training these animals to be actors without creating another law that
would suffer from non-enforcement. The added appeal of a
prohibition against the use of chimpanzees and other great apes in
entertainment is that such a law would essentially enforce itself
because a project could not use any of these animals if it intended to
commercially profit from its distribution, since the appearance of a
prohibited animal would disclose the violation and serve as evidence
for the offense.
VI. Liberty & Equality Rights for Chimpanzees
One reason Americans acknowledge liberty and equality in each
other is that each person's own liberty and equality depends on this
mutual recognition. Although the law protects the liberty and
equality of each individual, to some extent liberty and equality
depend on reciprocal exchanges. In contrast, acknowledging certain
liberties in chimpanzees and other great apes, like the right to be free
from use in entertainment or exploitation in medical research, must
be completely altruistic in that such recognition does not create
financial gain or some other quantifiable benefit. However, the case
for recognizing certain liberties in chimpanzees and other great apes
can be made by taking a closer look at the definition of equality and
liberty to exact what these principles actually mean.
The difference between equality and liberty is that equality
requires likes be treated alike whereas liberty suggests that someone
receives rights because of who she is without being compared to
anything.172 In this sense, people should grant chimpanzees certain
171. Id.
172. WISE, supra note 6, at 29.
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liberty rights because they are chimpanzees. However, this choice
requires people to value chimpanzees and other great apes over the
monetary gain that may be realized by their exploitation-a daunting
request in today's money-driven society. Alternatively, some argue
that any animal might be entitled to equality rights even if the animal
is not entitled to liberty rights, because the animal is like someone
who possesses basic liberty rights. 73 The significant and substantial
similarities between chimpanzees and humans previously noted
suggest, under this reasoning, that chimpanzees are entitled to rights
because they are like humans. Although this argument is seemingly
speciesist, it is not. To clarify, chimpanzees deserve rights not because
they are similar to humans, but. because humans recognize these
rights in each other and therefore should recognize these rights in
other like beings. "[T]here is no moral quality which separates [a
chimpanzee] from other people who are rightly protected under the
Constitution."'7 4 In addition, most judges believe that practical
autonomy is sufficient for basic liberty rights if the autonomy includes
an awareness of self.'75 Further still, some authors argue that under
the common law, adult chimpanzees are entitled to basic legal rights
because they possess certain advanced mental abilities. 76
Some believe chimpanzees should not be afforded basic liberties
or rights because they are not human-that for example, the right to
life or the right to be free from medical exploitation is one limited to
humans. The flaw in this justification is that "even using a human
yardstick, at least some nonhuman animals are entitled to recognition
as legal persons.''7
The chimpanzees share with us a number of psychological
characteristics that have not been found in other species. One of
these is the ability to engage in pretend play; another is to be able
to see the world from another individual's point of view. Some
human beings (namely autistic individuals) lack both of these
abilities, yet we are happy to treat them ... as human.
78
Furthermore, "[t]here is nothing that humans with the most serious
intellectual disabilities can do or feel that chimpanzees or gorillas
cannot; moreover, there is much that a chimpanzee or a gorilla can do
173. Id. at 29.
174. Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn
Hart, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 13 (2000).
175. WISE, supra note 6, at 32.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id. at 240.
178. Dunbar, supra note 9, at 110.
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that a profoundly mentally disabled human cannot do." '179 Advocating
that chimpanzees are not entitled to rights because they are not
human necessitates defining what it means to be human.
To be human arguably means more than having a given genetic
composition, especially since ships and corporations are legal,,persons. ,,18
Corporations... are relative newcomers to personhood and they,
of course, are persons for some purposes, but not for others....
[C]orporations can be criminally liable but cannot be incarcerated;
they must pay taxes, but cannot vote. The legal category of persons
never has been fixed or static, and is not now limited to human
beings. 8'
Many philosophers have described what it means to be a person, and
under these varying definitions a compelling case could be made to
include chimpanzees and other great apes. For instance, "[tiheologian
Joseph Fletcher provided a list of 'indicators of humanhood' that
includes self-awareness, self-control, a sense of future, a sense of the
past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, curiosity, and
communication. ' 12 Chimpanzees have virtually all of these
"indicators of humanhood." One could also argue, given the
numerous biological, psychological, and behavioral similarities, that
whatever makes a person human, chimpanzees possess enough of
those traits to deserve rights beyond those granted to forms of
property, at the very least.
[O]nce we accept or even suspect that humans are not the only
beings with personalities, not the only beings capable of rational
thought and problem-solving, not the only beings to experience joy
and sadness and despair, and above all not the only beings to
experience mental as well as physical suffering, we become less
arrogant, a little less sure that we have the inalienable right to make
use of other life forms in any way we please so long as there is a
possible benefit for us.
183
While it "is true that apes cannot make a deliberate argument for
their rights,... neither can young children or oppressed people whose
oppressors refuse to learn their language; yet morally we protect their
179. Christoph Anst6tz, Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great
Apes: A Comparison, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY
158, 165 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993).
180. Under the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1976), "the term 'person'
includes any individual, partnership, firm, joint stock company, corporation, association,
trust, estate, or other legal entity."
181. Hall & Waters, supra note 174, at 1.
182. Id. at 18.
183. NICHOLS & GOODALL, supra note 27, at 71.
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rights, at least in principle."1 84 Chimpanzees are similar enough to
"humans" to make the abuse inherent in "actor" training parallel to
the criticized aspects of human slavery. Acknowledging rights in
chimpanzees and other great apes to be free from exploitation does
not require bestowing on them citizenship status and the right to vote.
It does however require that these animals be afforded the dignity
they deserve by at the very least prohibiting their exploitation as
"actors."
VII. Conclusion
Even though our legal system is structured so that virtually any
animal exploitation can be regarded as necessary for entertainment
purposes1 8 the use and abuse of chimpanzees as "actors" is truly
unnecessary when one thinks about how little a role chimpanzees and
great apes actually play in the entertainment industry. It seems as
though such horrific cruelty and heart-breaking abuse to these
sophisticated, intelligent, and sentient creatures cannot possibly exist
in the year 2005, but it does.
Surely the empire that is the entertainment industry could thrive
and continue to command large sums of money without the use of
chimpanzees and other great apes. The advanced computer
technology available to the entertainment industry, which makes it
possible to simulate a chimpanzee or digitally recreate one, only
increases the insignificance of using live chimpanzees in filmed media.
Chimpanzees deserve protection beyond the meager safeguards
afforded to them by current federal regulations and anti-cruelty
laws-they need explicit protection from exploitation in
entertainment. Federal regulations suffer from non-enforcement;
both by agencies empowered to enforce those laws, and by citizens
who cannot establish standing to sue for enforcement. Anti-cruelty
laws are impotent to protect chimpanzees; the laws may prohibit the
actions implemented by trainers to subdue a chimpanzee's natural
behaviors, but enforcement is virtually impossible against violators.
Furthermore, "anticruelty statutes are explicitly designed not to
interfere with many activities that most people would regard as
cruel. '" 6 Chimpanzee "actors" must live in unnatural settings, in
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inadequate social groups, and be routinely physically abused in order
to be among humans. If that were not enough, this first phase of their
lives replaces a childhood that would have otherwise been filled with
play and which they would have spent in close proximity to their
families. After that they are subjugated to lives of further boredom
and torture, locked in cages without companions or adequate
stimulation.
Chimpanzees and other great apes can be protected from use in
entertainment without changing the law classifying great apes as
property. Nor is it necessary to label them as persons. We need simply
to recognize their undeniable traits, their acknowledged culture,
personalities, and abilities to think and feel that corresponds with
ours. With the curtain drawn aside and the reality of chimpanzee
training exposed to the light, the popular desire for great apes in
entertainment should logically subside. What reasonable person
would condone the daily beating of a two-year-old child in order to
force her to act on command? Chimpanzee actors possess the
intellectual capacity of that two-year-old-and possibly a heightened
awareness of pain and separation from their families.
It is this author's hope that with the inherent brutality behind the
onstage and onscreen presentation of chimpanzee "actors" presented
here, the next decade will free chimpanzees from props and human
clothing, and allow them to live in closer semblance to the life they
would have known.
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